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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Personal use is the use of copyrighted works for private

purposes,

such as

learning or entertainment.

Reading a

copyrighted book, watching a copyrighted movie or television
program,

listening to or singing a copyrighted song,

and

employing a copyrighted computer software are all within the
scope of personal use. An issue arises when individual users

want to make a copy of the copyrighted works

New

technologies,

videotape recorders

,

such

as

1

photocopying machines and

make the copying of the copyrighted

works become much cheaper and more convenient. Copyright
owners think that individual users'

occasional copying for

private use is harmful to their potential market and they
strongly argue for compensation. Does the personal users have
the right to reproduce the copyrighted works for private
reasons? If the answer is positive, what is the scope of this

kind of reproduction?
The confusion about the personal use principle is due to
the controversy about the nature of copyright itself. Since

the nature of copyright determines the nature and scope of

1

& STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF
(1991), hereinafter referred to as Patterson & Lindberg.

See L. RAY PATTERSON

users'

Rights 193

2

the subordinate principles and rules, the uncertainty of it

results in the confusion about the personal users'

rights.

There are two contradictory theories concerning the nature of
copyright: one is the natural-law property right theory, the

basis of the common-law copyright,

and the other is

the

positive-law theory, the basis of the statutory copyright.
Both natural law and positive law influenced the development
of copyright.

2

Under the concept of natural law,

the proprietor of a

certain object owns complete rights over his or her own
property except a few limitations. Because an author creates
the work,

the assumption is that the work is the author's

property.

It

means that an author has complete property

rights on the work because of creation. That is, due to the

law of

nature and reason,

an

author has the common-law

copyright upon the work. 3
However, the other viewpoint argues that copyright is a
right of the positive law which is granted by legislation for
the public welfare. The source of copyright is the statute,

which gives authors certain exclusive rights in the work.
Copyright is thus a statutory-grant right.
2

See id. at 109-110;

Use,

55 LAW

&

CONTEMP.

see also L.

PROB .

2,

Ray Patterson,

Understanding Fair

249, at 249 (1992).

3
Justice Aston, in Millar v. Taylor, explained the meaning of the
common law. He said that "The common law, now so called, is founded on
the law of nature and reason. Its grounds, maxims and principles are
derived from many different fountains ,... from natural and moral
philosophy, from the civil and canon law, from logic, from the use,
custom and conversation among men, collected out of the general
disposition, nature and condition of human kind. " (footnote omitted) 4

Burr. 2303, 2343; 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 223 (1769).

3

The choice of the nature of copyright should reflect the

purpose of copyright in the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Copyright Clause contains the purpose and

basic concepts of copyright, which are the most important
guide for copyright legislation.

Congress

shall

It reads as

follows:

"The

have Power... to Promote the Progress

of

Science..., by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings...." 4
The promotion of learning 5 is the purpose of copyright.
The exclusive right given to authors for limited times is the

method used to encourage creations and distributions of the
works for the progress of knowledge. The purpose of copyright
as

promotion of

learning

is

for

protecting the public

interests, rather than benefiting authors.

One aspect of public interests is citizen's rights to use
the copyrighted works, that is, individual users' rights. For

promoting learning, the general public needs sufficient ways
of access to the copyrighted works and enough rights to use

the works.

This implies that the Copyright Clause of the

Constitution presupposes individual's right of use of the
copyrighted works. The personal users' rights are protected
directly by the Constitution.

U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl.8.

When the Copyright Clause was legislated in the eighteenth century,
"science" meant "knowledge or learning." The purpose of copyright, in
modern terms, is to promote the progress of knowledge and learning. See
Patterson & LlNDBERG, supra note 1, at 48.
5

4

The scope of personal users

rights is decided by the

'

nature of copyright. If copyright is a common-law right, it

follows

that

authors

rights

'

on

the works

are complete

property rights, which may be subject to some limitations.
Users, basically, have no rights on the copyrighted works

except those conferred by the statute.

If copyright

is

a

statutory-grant right, authors have the rights given by the

statute only. Any other rights upon the works belong to
society. Users would have more rights to use the copyrighted

works
The debate about the nature of copyright began at England
in the eighteenth century, which was for explaining the 1710

Statute of

Such

Anne.

stationers (publishers

)

a

controversy

was

because

the

lost some rights in the Statute of

Anne. The history of the stationers'

copyright before 1710

was a prelude which resulted in the debate of the nature of

copyright. Since these events in England still have influence
on modern statutory copyright, the analysis of the personal

use principle in this paper will start at an review of the
early English copyright history.
The following chapter is an explanation of the purpose of

copyright

in

the

Copyright

Clause

of

the

American

Constitution. The nature of American copyright is the next
issue to be analyzed. After clarifying the purpose and nature
of copyright, we will focus on the 1976 Copyright Act. That

the expansion of

the copyright owners'

unfortunately endangers the users'

exclusive rights

right of access to the

5

copyrighted works is our next topic. Finally, we will have an

interpretation of the personal users
copyright Act.

'

rights under current

CHAPTER

2

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT

Copyright

in

England

originated

as

the

stationers'

copyright. 6 This development was a response to the advent of

the printing press which was introduced into England in 1476.
This technology makes books that can be mass reproduced in a

quick and convenient way. For protecting published books from
piracy, the members of the book trade established some form
of property. This kind of property, finally, was to be called

copyright

The important point about the stationers

not

that

the

stationers

originated

it,

'

copyright was

but

that

they

controlled its development for a hundred and fifty years and,
furthermore, influenced the subsequent statutory copyright. 7
The reason that the stationers controlled the development of

6 Copyright might originate between 1518 and 1542, when the first book
was printed and published under the privilege of the government. But,
no matter what the precise date copyright originated, it is almost sure
that copyright in England originated as the stationers' copyright. See
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE [hereinafter PATTERSON,
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE] 42-4 3 (1968).

There were two kinds of copyright before the 1710 Statute of Anne:
copyright and the other was the printing
one was the stationers
patent. Printing patent was a publication right granted by the royal
prerogative. This right declined in the latter part of the seventeenth
century. The stationers' copyright thus became the model of the
statutory copyright. About the details of printing patent, see
generally id. at 78-113.
7

'

7

copyright for such a long time was partly because of the
government's desire for censorship.

Censorship had been one of the government policies even
before the advent of the printing press. 8 The arrival of the

printing press just transferred the sovereign's attention
from authors to printers and publishers. In the 1530'

s,

Henry

VIII separated from the Roman Catholic Church, which created

formidable religious

a

thus,

and political unrest.

Censorship,

became the sovereign's systematic business. Copyright

at the beginning was

an instrument

for censorship and a

device for booksellers' private interests.
This chapter will start with the stationers

'

copyright and

its relationship to the government press control. The Statute

of Anne, which used the stationers'
is

the

following

stationers

'

issue.

It

copyright as the model,

was

the

change

from

the

copyright to the statutory copyright that caused

the debate about the nature of copyright. A review of this

controversy

in

England

will

give

us

a

more

precise

understanding about the nature of copyright.

A. The Stationers'

Copyright

The beginning of the stationers' copyright was May 4, 1557,

when the guild of stationers received a royal charter from
Catholic Philip and Mary Tudor to incorporate the Company of

8

See id. at 23.

8

Stationers of London.

9

This

charter gave the Stationers'

Company the right to search out and destroy illegal printed

materials and granted the printing rights of most of the
books

to the

charter

was

stationers.
to

use

the

Mary's motive in granting this

stationers

as

an

suppressing seditious and heretical books.

agency

for

Although the

internal organization of the Brotherhood of Stationers still

functioned in the same way,

10

this

charter promoted the

stationers as the government's partner for censorship. The
stationers' copyright, thus, was endorsed by the sovereign.

The stationers

'

copyright was an exclusive right to print

and publish. The purpose of this right was for protecting

published books from piracy on the market. There were two
important aspects of the stationers' copyright: one was that
it was perpetual and the other was that only the members of

the Company were qualified to obtain this copyright. 11
9

The guild of stationers was founded in 14 03 under the grant of the
Mayor and Aldermen of London. See id. at 29.
10 The framework of the Stationers
Company was composed of three main
parts. At the top of the Company was the livery. It included a
principal officer, the master, the upper warden and under warden, the
clerk, and the senior and junior renter wardens. The master, who was
assisted by the upper and under warden, had the right to search out and
destroy illegal printed materials. The primary job of the clerk was to
keep the Company's records. The responsibility of the renter wardens
was to collect membership fees once a quarter.
The members below the livery were freemen, the commonalty or
yeomanry, apprentices who became free, freemen's sons who inherited the
patrimony, persons who transferred from another company, the men who
purchased a copy of the book, the beadle, and the brothers.
At the bottom of the Company were the apprentices. See generally id.
*

at 28-36.
11

In fact, authors could obtain copyright sometimes. However, in most
cases, the relationship between the stationers and the authors was that
the stationers obtained permission from the authors for publishing the
works and the authors obtained payment from the stationers. If the
authors owned the copyright, the stationer, even though promising to

9

The procedure for the stationers to obtain copyright was
to get a license from the official authorities, then present

licensed copy to the Company wardens for permission, then
enter the title of the work and the owner's name of this
title in the register book of the Company. Before 1637, the

entrance was just a custom, not a legal requirement. The Star

Chamber Decree of 1637 firmly established that the entrance
was a requirement for copyright.

The Stationers

12

Company was governed by the ordinances

'

drafted by the Company itself and which were approved by the

government.

important

An

feature which can help us

understand the nature of the stationers

'

to

copyright was about

the jurisdiction. The Court of Assistants of the Stationers'

Company had the jurisdiction over any members. Any disputes

between members

or

regarding the book trade

should be

submitted to the Court of Assistants before carried to any
other court. This meant that common-law courts took no hand
in the development of the stationers' copyright.

Although even without government censorship regulations,

copyright would

still

have

been

created and developed

substantially as it did, the existence of censorship enhanced
the stationers

'

monopoly and their right to control the

development of copyright. 13 The stationers'

role in press

publish the work, would not like to promote it. See id. at 35-36,

64-

77.

About the procedure and form of entrance and whether the entrance
was a requirement for copyright, see generally id. at 51-64.
12

13 The proclamations of censorship prior to the royal charter of 1557
were the proclamation of 1486-87 by Henry VII, the proclamations of

1U

control was as policemen, rather than as judges or arbiters.

Since the sovereign had no concern on private property right,

the stationers not only had monopoly of printing, but also

had

the

right

to

freely

create

and

develop

copyright

according to their own interests

While the government used copyright as an instrument for
press control, the courts or the legislature played no role
in the development of copyright. This further explains why

authors'

right was

not developed at that

time.

To

the

government, it meant the difficulty for press control. To the

stationers,

it meant the

sharing of rights.

Both of them

would not like it to be developed.
In

1688,

the

Glorious

Revolution

occurred

and

the

religious unrest ceased. Both the government censorship and

the

stationers'

monopoly were

detested

by

the public.

Parliament refused to renew the Licensing Act of 1662 in
1694. The stationers lost legal support for their monopolies.

They petitioned the Parliament for recovering all their
benefits. Parliament rejected censorship regulations.
stationers thus turned to claim authors

'

The

rights in order to

1529, 1530, 1536, 1538, 1544, 1545 and 1546 during Henry VIII's reign,
the proclamation by Edward VI in 1551, and the proclamations of 1533
and 1555 by Queen Mary Tudor.
After 1557, Elizabeth I issued the royal charter of 1558 and the
Star Chamber Decree of 1566 and 1586. Then, Charles I promulgated the
Star Chamber Decree of 1637. In the period of Interregnum, Parliament
enacted the ordinances of 1643, 1647, and 1649. The Licensing Act of
1662 was proclaimed during Charles II 's reign. It was based on the Star
Chamber Decree of 1637 and became the model for the enactment of the
Statute of Anne.
About the history of government censorship and press control, see
generally id. at 20-27 114-142.
,

-mmm—mna

irfi i

n

11

save their old monopolies.

14

The result, then, was the 1710

Statute of Anne.

B.

The Statute of Anne

The primary purpose of the Statute of Anne was to restore the

order

in

the

pandemonium.

15

book

trade

after

almost

sixteen

years

The title of the Statute of Anne said that it

was "An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the

copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such
copies, during the times therein mentioned." 16 In fact, after

examining the provisions of the Statute of Anne,

it showed

that this statute was a trade regulation act to control the
stationers' monopoly, rather than an act for protecting the

authors

'

rights

Section

I

of the Statute of Anne broke up the stationers

perpetual copyright by limiting the duration of copyright. It
gave the books which were already printed a twenty-one-year

copyright extension.

The books printed after

1710

had a

fourteen-year duration. 17 Section XI further provided that if
14 For details about the early history of copyright, see generally id.
at 1-142. See also Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 19-23.

The Statute of Anne, in fact, was not the first English copyright
act. Before it, there were several royal charters, Star Chamber
Decrees, ordinances, and the Licensing Act of 1662. These acts were all
censorship regulations. The Statute of Anne was the first English
copyright statute legislated by the Parliament without any censorship
purpose. See Patterson, historical perspective, supra note 6, at 12.
15

16

8

17

Id.

Anne, c. 19.
§1.

12

the author was still alive after the expiration of the first
14

years,

he or she could have copyright protection

for

another 14 years. 18 After the expiration of copyright, books

went into the public domain. This is the

concept

of

the

public

domain

emerged

first time that the

in

the copyright

history.

Another method to destroy booksellers' monopoly was that
everybody had the right to obtain copyright even if he or she
was not the member of the Stationers' Company. According to
§111,

if

the clerk of the Stationers'

Company refused to

register, make entry, or give certificate to the author or

proprietor of the copy or copies

could advertise in the Gazette,
secure the copyright.

,

the author or proprietor

the legal newspaper'

to

19

Moreover, §IV required booksellers to maintain the price
of the books at a reasonable rate. 20 Section VII permitted

the importation and sale of books in foreign language printed

beyond the sea. 21

Since the Statute of Anne allowed authors to transfer
their copyright to other persons, the real beneficiaries were

still

the

18

id.

19

id. §iii.

20

id.

§iv.

21

id.

§vn.

booksellers. 22

Under

the

ordinary

situation,

§xi.

According to the title of the Statute of Anne, purchasers of the
copies of printed books could become the copyright owner. 8 Anne, c.
19. This indicated that copyright was transferable. Booksellers still
controlled the book trade.
22

13

authors must assign their copyright to booksellers in order
to be paid, otherwise, their works would not be printed and

published.

Only the renewal right,

reserved to the authors. 23

In

codified in §XI,

general,

was

authors were not

entitled to copyright until the enactment of the Statute of
Anne. The copyright in the Statute of Anne was functioned as
a publisher's right.

A comparision of the provisions of the Statute of Anne

with the rules of the stationers
booksellers'

'

copyright shows that the

rights were severely curtailed. Not only the

duration of copyright was limited rather than perpetual, but

also

anybody

stationers

'

could

become

the

copyright

owner.

The

petition for recovering their old benefit was

unavoidably

After the old copyright expired in 1731, the booksellers'
fear about losing the power on the book trade and about the

possibility of lessened livelihood pushed them to try other
tricks to secure their monopolies. They urged that an author

had a common-law copyright, which resulted in the debate
about the nature of copyright. The meaning of the Statute of
Anne, however, was settled sixty years after its enactment,

23

id. §xi.

14
C. Authors'

Common-Law Copyright in England

The main point of the booksellers'

argument was that an

author had the common-law copyright because he or she creates
the work. The intention of the booksellers was to use the

author as a chip for getting back their monopolies. If the

authors

had

a

complete

property

right

on

the work

in

perpetuity, it meant that the booksellers would have this
right by assignment. The purpose of this proposition was to
elude the limitations posed by the Statute of Anne.
In fact,

copyright in the Statute of Anne operated as a

publishers' right because it used the stationers' copyright
as the model for its enactment. Before the booksellers argued

for authors' rights, authors, in most of the cases, could not

even be qualified as the copyright owners. Moreover, commonlaw courts had no position to help the development of the

stationers'

copyright.

The so-called authors'

common-law

copyright had never existed until the booksellers claimed it.
The whole process about the booksellers' attempt to save

their monopoly was called the "Battle of the Booksellers."
This battle lasted for more than forty years. 24 There were

many petitions and cases during this period of time. Among
them, Millar v. Taylor25 and Donaldson v. Beckett 26 were the
The "Battle of the Booksellers" started in 1734, when the
booksellers petitioned the Parliament for a new bill to save their
perpetual monopoly. The whole campaign was full of petitions and cases.
Not until 17 74 did the nature of copyright get an answer in Donaldson
v. Beckett. For more details about this situation, see Patterson,
24

Historical PERSPECTIVE,
25

4

supra note

6,

at 151-79.

Burr. 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).

15

most important cases. They decided the nature of English
copyright and influenced the choice of the nature of American
copyright

(1).

Millar

v.

Taylor

Andrew Millar was a bookseller who owned the copyright of
"The Seasons." Millar obtained the printing and publishing

permission from the author, James Thomson, in 1729. According
to the Statute of Anne, this copyright had expired in 1757.

Robert Taylor published and sold copies of

"The Seasons"

without the license or consent from Millar. In 1767, Millar
sued Taylor for copyright infringement before the Court of
King' s Bench.

The plaintiff alleged that an author had a common-law

copyright after publication and this right had not taken away
by the Statute of Anne. 27 The defendant strongly disagreed. 28

26 4 Burr. 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. 257;
Pari. Hist. 953 (1813).

1

Eng. Rep.

837

(1774);

17

Cobbett

'

27

The counsel for the plaintiff alleged that "there is a real property
remaining in authors, after publication of their works; and... that this
right is a common law right, which always has existed, and does still
exist, independent of and not taken away by the statute of 8 Ann. c.
19."
28

4

Burr, at 2304; 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.

The counsel for the defendant absolutely denied that "any such
property remained in the author, after the publication of his work; and
they treated the pretension of a common law right to it, as mere fancy
and imagination, void of any ground or foundation." They argued that
"formerly the printer, not the author, was the person who was supposed
to have the right,... and accordingly the grants were all made to
printers. No right remains in the author, at common law."
They further insisted that "if an original author publishes his work,
he sells it to the public; and the purchaser of every book or copy has
a right to make what use of it he pleases;....

16

The issues in this case were:

"1st. Whether the copy of a

book, or literary composition, belongs to the author, by the

common law; 2d. Whether the common law-right of authors to
the copies of their own works is taken away by

8

Ann.

c.

19."29

Four judges delivered their opinions and decided that an

author had a common-law right and this right was not taken
away by the Statute of Anne in a three-to-one verdict.

Justice Willes, Justice Aston and Lord Mansfield ruled for
the plaintiff. The main reason was that the work was created

through the author's labour, so it should be the author's
property. It was just to apply the concepts of property by

occupancy to the author's creation. The author should have
the common-law copyright. 30 This right could not be found in

custom,

but,

according to the natural principles, moral

justice and fitness, it was just for an author to reap the

profits and to protect the integrity and paternity of the
work. 31 This copy-right had not taken away by the Statute of
Anne.

32

The Act of Parliament of 8 Ann. c. 19, for the encouragement of
learning, vests the copies of printed books in the authors or
purchasers of such copies, during the times therein limited. But it is
only during that limited time; and under the terms prescribed by the
Act. And the utmost extent of the limited time is, in the present case,
expired. ..."
4 Burr, at 2304; 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.
29

4

Burr, at 2311; 98 Eng. Rep. at 206

30 This opinion was based on Justice Aston' s speech. He alleged that "a
man may have property in his body, life, fame, labours, and the like;
and, in short, in any thing that can be called his." 4 Burr, at 233554; 98 Eng. Rep. at 218-29.
31 Lord Mansfield thought that the source of the common law right was
drawn from the argument that "it is just, that an author should reap

17

A dissenting opinion was rendered by Justice Yates. He
asserted that an author had no common-law copyright because
the concepts of property by occupancy could not apply to the

style and ideas. 33 This common-law right of the author did
not exist in custom. 34 The statutory copyright granted by the

the pecuniary profits of his own ingenuity and labour. It is just, that
another should not use his name, without his consent. It is fit that he
should judge when to publish, or whether he ever will publish. It is
fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication;
how many; what volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose
care he will trust the accuracy and correctness of the impression; in
whose honesty he will confide, not to foist in additions: with other
reasonings of the same effect." He thought that this author's commonlaw right before publication should be applied to author even after he
or she published the work. The language of the Statute of Anne had no
implications to expel the common-law copyright. 4 Burr, at 2395-2403;
98 Eng. Rep. at 250-55.
32 Justice Willes
opinion for the plaintiff was that he used the
stationers' copyright as the model of the common-law copyright. His
supporting evidences were the decrees of the Star-Chamber, Acts of
State, and several precedents which were decided based on these
previous censorship regulations. 4 Burr, at 2310-2335; 98 Eng. Rep. at
205-218. Justice Yates, in his dissenting opinion, thought that the
stationers
copyright was irrelevant to the authors
common-law
copyright because "the by-laws of the Stationers' Company protect none
98 Eng. Rep. at 241. and
but their own members."
4 Burr, at 2377;
because "no author whatever had from them(the by-laws), the least
pretension to copy-right." 4 Burr, at 2371; 98 Eng. Rep. at 238.
'

'

'

33

Justice Yates said that property "is a right by which the very
substance of a thing belongs to one person, so that it cannot. .become
another s. .. .Sentiments are free and open to all; and many people may
have the same ideas upon the same subject. In that case, every one of
these persons to whom they independently occur, is equally possessed
and equally master of all these ideas; and has an equal right to them
as his own." 4 Burr, at 2358; 98 Eng. Rep. at 231.
.

'

34

4 Burr,
at 2367-69; 98 Eng. Rep. at 236-37. Justice Yates thought
that "to constitute a legal custom, it must have these two qualities:
first, a custom must import some general right in a district, and not a
few mere private acts of individuals; and, in the next place, such
custom must appear to have existed immemorially " But, "the art of
printing was not known in this kingdom, till the reign of Ed. 4.
therefore these contracts could not be derived from the ancient
immemorial law of the land: and, consequently, they could not create a
species of property which was unknown to that law." So the common law
copyright did not exist in custom.
.
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Statute of Anne was the only right the author had after
publication. 35
The conclusion of Millar v. Taylor was that an author had

the common-law right after, as well as before, publication.

The booksellers still had the monopoly in perpetuity. The

purpose of the Statute of Anne for against monopoly was
negated under this decision.

(2). Donaldson v. Beckett

Millar

v.

Taylor was not appealed. The decision gave Andrew

Millar the perpetual property interests on his copy
Seasons," but he died in 1768.

"The

The executors of Millar's

estate auctioned all his copies off in 1769. The syndicate of

Thomas Beckett and other

fourteen partners obtained the

copyright of "The Seasons."

Alexander and John Donaldson thought that the copyright of
"The Seasons" was expired under the provisions of the Statute

of Anne, so they printed and sold thousands of copies of "The

Seasons." In 17 72, Beckett and his partners,

in accordance

with the decision of the Millar case, acquired a perpetual
injunction from the Court of Chancery to restrain Donaldsons.
Donaldsons appealed to the House of Lords
The issue in Donaldson

v.

Beckett was whether the author

had the common-law right of sole printing and publishing the

work
35

4

in

perpetuity.

The

House

of

Burr, at 2354-96; 98 Eng. Rep. at 229-50.

Lords

directed

five

19

questions to the judges of the common-law courts, the Court
of

King's

Common Pleas

Bench,

Exchequer

and

for

their

advisory opinions. These questions were:

1.

Whether at common law, an author of any book or
literary composition had the sole right of first

printing and publishing the same for sale; and

might bring an action against any person who
printed published and sold the same without his
consent?
2.

If the author had such right originally, did the

law

take

it

upon

away,

his

printing

and

publishing such book or literary composition; and

might any person afterward reprint and sell, for

his

benefit,

own

such

book

or

literary

composition, against the will of the author?
3.

If such action would have lain at common law,

is

it taken away by the Statute of 8th Ann.? And is

an author,

by the said statute precluded from

every remedy except on the foundation of the said

statute

and

on

the

terms

and

conditions

prescribed thereby?
4.

Whether the author of any literary composition
and his assigns, had the sole right of printing

and publishing the same in perpetuity,
common law?

by the

20
5.

Whether

this

right

is

any

way

impeached

restrained or taken away by the statute 8th
Ann.? 36

The answers of these five questions were: (1) Yes. (2) No.
(3)

Yes.

(4)

Yes.

(5)

Yes.

37

The first three questions dealt

with only the author's right and the last two with the right
of the author and his assigns. The fourth question was added

for reconsidering the Millar case. After hearing the judges'

opinions, the lords debated and reversed the grant of the
perpetual injunction. 38
The main reasons to object the common-law copyright were

that the author's common-law right had never existed in
previous copyright history until the booksellers claimed it 39
and ideas should be free of use once the author released them

36

4

Burr, at 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. at 257-58,

37

Eleven judges delivered their opinions. Six of them stood against
the authors' common-law right, and the other five supported the
existence of this right. About the content of the judges' opinions, see
17 Cobbett's Pari. Hist, at 971-92.
38

The lords, by a vote of 22 to 11, reversed the decree of the Court
of Chancery for granting the perpetual injunction. See 17 Cobbett's
Pari. Hist, at 1003.
39

The statements of Lord Chief Justice De Grey and Lord Camden were
good examples of this argument. Lord Chief Justice De Grey said that
"The truth is, the idea of a common-law right in perpetuity was not
taken up till after that failure in procuring a new statute for an
enlargement of the term." 17 Cobbett's Pari. Hist, at 992. Lord Camden
supported this opinion and spoke that "The arguments attempted to be
maintained on the side of the Respondents, were founded on patents,
privileges, Star-chamber decrees, and the bye laws of the Stationers'
Company ;.. .the very last places in which I should have dreamt of
finding the least trace of the common law of this kingdom..." Ibid.
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to the public. 40 On the other hand,

the supporters of the

common-law copyright thought that ideas were the author's
property even after publication, so the author should have a
perpetual common-law copyright. 41

The

conclusion of Donaldson

v.

was

Beckett

that

an

author's common-law right was taken away and supplanted by

the

Statute

of

Anne

after

publication.

The common-law

copyright meant the exclusive right of first publication
only.

In

fact,

even without

this

decision,

the

author

presumably had the first publication right. Once an author

published his or her work, he or she had only the rights
granted by the Statute of Anne. But the rights granted by the

Statute of Anne were merely the

interests derived from

publication. An author still has the right to protect the

attribution and integrity of his or her work because of

40

This point could be explained by the following argument of Lord
Camden that "If there be any thing in the world common to all mankind,
science and learning are in their nature publici juris, and they ought
to be as free and general as air or water." 17 Cobbett s Pari. Hist, at
999, and that "Knowledge has no value or use for the solitary owner: to
be enjoyed it must be communicated. .. .Glory is the reward of science,
and those who deserve it,..." Id. at 1000.
'

41 Judge Ashurst was one of the proponents for the author's common-law
copyright and contended that ideas should be claimed as the author's
property. He urged that "Literary property was to be defined and
described as well as other matters, and matters which were tangible.
Every thing was property that was capable of being known or defined,
capable of a separate enjoyment, and of value to the owner. Literary
property fell within the terms of this definition. According to the
appellants, if a man lends his manuscript to his friend, and his friend
prints it, or if he loses it, and the finder prints it, yet an action
would lie..., which shewed that there was a property beyond the
materials, the paper and print. That a man, by publishing his book,
gave the public nothing more than the use of it. A man may give the
public a highway through his field, and if there was a mine under that
highway, it was nevertheless his property." 17 Cobbett s Pari. Hist, at
'

976-77.
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creation even after publication. This error was because the

assumption that the Statute of Anne contained an author's
complete interests of the work. For rejecting the author's

common-law

copyright,

it

was

only

need

to

reject

the

perpetual common-law copyright, but not necessarily meant
that an author lost all the rights upon the work after
publication

42

However, the holding of Donaldson v. Beckett was the only

way which could destroy the booksellers' monopoly. After this

decision,

copyright was an author's right rather than a

publisher's right. It was this author's right received into
the United States several years later.

About the opinions and comments of Donaldson v. Beckett, see
generally Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 36-46. See also Patterson,
Historical Perspective, supra note 6, at 172-79.
42

CHAPTER

3

THE PURPOSE AND POLICIES OF COPYRIGHT

The purpose and policies of copyright are articulated in the
U.S. Constitution. There are two Clauses in the Constitution

which are related to copyright. One is the IntellectualProperty Clause and the other is the First Amendment.
The Intellectual-Property Clause

contains

the

Patent

Clause and the Copyright Clause. It articulates the purpose
and policies for both patent and copyright. The content of it
is

"The Congress shall have Power... to Promote the Progress

of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to

Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective

Writings and Discoveries." 43 According to this language, the

purpose of copyright is to promote learning by empowering
Congress to give authors the exclusive right to their works.
The First Amendment is for protecting public

'

s

rights of

free speech and press. It provides that "Congress shall make

no

law.

..

abridging

press...." 44
43

the

freedom

of

speech,

or

The two rights in the First Amendment

of

the
the

U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl.8.

44 The First Amendment reads as follows:
"Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST, amend. I.

23
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right of free speech and the right of free press

are known

together as "free speech rights."

The

free

speech

rights

are

the

public's

rights

to

disseminate and have access to information. However, the
Copyright Clause gives Congress a power to grant authors the

exclusive right which is a restraint on users'

right of

access. In appearance, they conflict with each other, but, in
fact, they could complement one another.

In

this

chapter,

we will

first explain the purpose,

policies and the functional scheme of the Copyright Clause.
The free speech in the First Amendment and its relationship
to the Copyright Clause are the following issues that we will

discuss in the second part of this chapter.

A.

The Purpose and Policies of Copyright in the Copyright

Clause

The Copyright Clause was enacted by using the title of the

Statute of Anne as its model. 45 The main purpose stated in
these two documents is the same: to promote the progress of
learning. An important difference between them was that the

Statute of Anne protected publishers as well as authors, but
the Copyright Clause protects authors only.

45 Not only the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution imitated the
English Statute of Anne, but the various American state statutes and
the federal Copyright Act of 1790 also used this statute as a model to
legislate their own acts. The English copyright is the lineal ancestor
of the American copyright. See Patterson, historical perspective, supra
note 6, at 3.
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There are four policies

in the Copyright Clause:

the

promotion of learning; the preservation of the public domain;

protection

the

of

the

authors'

exclusive

rights

of

publication; and the general public's right of access. 46 A

precise understanding of these policies can help to decide
the nature of copyright as well as the subordinate principles
and rules.

(

1

)

.

Promotion of the Progress of Learning

The purpose of copyright is

science.

Copyright exists

to

for

promote the progress
the reason of

of

making the

advancement of the welfare of entire society. For achieving
this purpose, Congress is empowered to secure to authors the

exclusive right for a limited period of time.

The functional scheme the Copyright Clause designed to

attain the purpose of promoting knowledge is to use the

exclusive

right

as

an

inducement

to

encourage authors'

creations and distribution of the works.

creations

In

and distribution of the works

theory,

can

more

enrich the

culture and make the progress of knowledge. This should be
under the premise that the works have the chance to be used
by the society. Copyright is construed around the concept of

the use of the work. 47

46

See Patterson

47

Id.

&

at 191-92.

Lindberg,

supra note

1,

at 47-49, 52.
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Since the protection of the authors'
just

a

method to promote learning,

exclusive right is

it

is

necessary to

establish limitations on the exclusive right for preventing
authors' overcontrol on the published works. The limitations

are established not only on the scope,

but also on the

protection time. The extent of the exclusive right given to
authors should reach the line that it can protect the works
on the market and would not be an obstacle to the progress of
science.

Copyright is

a

deal between the authors

and society.

Society confers the authors the monopoly to reap the benefit

from their own creations

.

The quid pro quo that authors

should offer the society is to allow the general public to
use the works

society.

to

.

Then the works can make certain contributions

The effect of

the

exclusive right given to

authors is to protect the works from piracy, not to prevent
the general public's use of the work. Giving the right to

users to use the work for personal reasons is a necessary

method for promoting learning.
principle.

The Constitution is

This is
just the

the

personal use

source that the

personal users' rights come from. 48

(

2

)

.

Preservation of the Public Domain

Public domain means that ideas, words and knowledge belong to

every members of our society. Everyone has the right to use
48

ibid.
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and employ ideas or words without any charge or limitations.

These ideas or words can not be owned by certain specific
persons. 49

To protect the public domain, there are three concepts.
First, a work should possess a certain degree of originality

for obtaining copyright. 50 Copyright is given because of the

author's creative combination and organization of the words
and ideas. The copyright protection reaches only to the parts

which are newly created. The author has no right to claim

copyright on the materials already in the public domain.

Originality is

a

required condition for a

work

to

get

copyright protection. 51
Second,

once the work is published,

the scope of the

exclusive right given to authors should be limited.

The

author should not have the absolutely control right on the

work which inevitably constitutes ideas and words from the
public domain.

Third,

the protection time should be limited. Authors

obtain the ideas and knowledge from society to form a new
49

See id. at 50-51.

50 The definition of the originality,
as developed by the courts,
contains two aspects: "independent creation by the author, and a modest
quantum of creativity." See Craig Joyce et al., Copyright law 55-56 (2d

ed.

1991).

51 Later in the
1976 Copyright Act, originality is codified as a
required condition for copyright. Section 102 of the 1976 Act says that
copyright protection subsists in "original works of authorship" and
does not extend to any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. §102 (1994).
Furthermore, §103 states that "the copyright in a compilation or
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author
of such work... and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material...." id. §103.
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work. By inference, it is not reasonable for them to have the

exclusive right in perpetuity. After they enjoy the monopoly
for a period of time, they should release the works back to

society. The result of this kind of process is that all the

works will go into the public domain and the culture and
knowledge of our society will be promoted. 52

(3). Protection of the Exclusive Right of Publication

Congress grants authors an exclusive right to their writings.
Since the Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution used the

title of the Statute of Anne as a model, we can find the

meaning of this exclusive right by tracing back to the
English history.

Throughout the period of the stationers' copyright, the
right which the stationers had on their

copies

was

the

exclusive right to print and publish. 53 The Statute of Anne

inherited this meaning.

It

vested the copyright only on

"printed books." 54
In

1769,

Millar

v.

Taylor, 55

which was viewed as

an

explanation of the Statute of Anne, clarified the content of
52

Prof. Chafee raised this theory in 1945. He said that "a dwarf
standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant
himself." The dwarf refers to the author and the giant society. Through
this process, knowledge will be promoted. Zecharich Chafee, Reflections
on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. rev. 503, at 511 (1945).
53

See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.

54

8

Anne, c. 19.

55

4

Burr. 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
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copy-right. It stated that "the copy of a book
as

technical expression of the author's sole right of

a

printing and publishing that work
'copy '...has been used for ages,

right

to

the

sole

printing

"

56

"...the word

and

to signify an incorporeal

and

publishing of somewhat

intellectual, communicated by letters." 57
the

legally used

It

clear that

is

"exclusive right" meant a sole right of printing and

publishing at that time. 58

Even though Donaldson v.

Beckett 59 overruled Millar v.

Taylor five years later, the meaning of the exclusive right

had not been changed.

Donaldson

v.

Beckett

rejected an

author's common-law copyright after publication. The author
only could have the right granted by the Statute of Anne once

the work was published.

The exclusive right given by the

Statute of Anne was the right to print and publish.

When the Copyright Clause was codified in 1787, there was
no other meaning could be found for the author's exclusive

right.

The content of the

"exclusive right"

in the U.S.

Constitution, at that time, was an exclusive right to "print,

publish and vend" the work. 60 The exclusive right in the
56 4

Burr, at 2346; 98 Eng. Rep. at 225.

57

Burr, at 2396; 98 Eng. Rep. at 251.

4

Even though the judges in Millar v. Taylor, in fact, treated the
copyright as the author's whole property interest of the work, they
expressly admitted the meaning of copyright as the sole right of
printing and publishing only.
58

59

Burr. 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. 257;
Pari. Hist. 953 (1813).
4

1

Eng. Rep.

837

(1774);

17

Cobbett

'

60 The copyright principle developed after 1787 supported this point of
view. Under the provisions of the 1790 Act, the copyright owner had the
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Copyright Clause is limited on its scope. Authors can only
have the exclusive right which the copyright statute gives to
them. The other rights belong to the public. The policy in

the Constitution is to give a limited-scope exclusive right
to authors for the promotion of learning.

(4). The Implied Right of Access

For promoting learning, the general public needs effective
and sufficient ways to have the chance to use the works. This
is the users'

right of access. The Copyright Clause does not

explicitly stipulate this right, however, the right of access
is necessary for promoting learning. If users can not or have

difficulties to use the copyrighted works,

how can

the

knowledge be promoted? The framers of the Constitution had
already considered the public's right of access when they
legislated the Copyright Clause.
The most powerful method to safeguard the right of access
is to make publication a prerequisite for obtaining copyright

protection. If every work needs to be published, the right of
access to the copyrighted works is guarateed. Otherwise, the

right of access would be endangered. 61
rights to print, reprint, publish and vend the work. 1 Stat. 124 §2
(1845). A digest, abridgment, or translation of the copyrighted work
was not an infringement of copyright because the result of these
conducts was a new work and it did not print, reprint, publish or vend
the original copyrighted work. See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at
60. This inferred that the exclusive right is an exclusive right to
print, publish and vend the work. The meaning of the exclusive right
was almost the same as that in the Copyright Clause.
61

See PATTERSON

&

LINDBERG, supra note

1,

at 52-55.
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The group which controls the publication of the works is
the publishers rather than the authors. But in the Copyright
Clause, the Congress only has the power to secure copyright

authors.

to

The publishers

excluded from copyright

are

protection.

The main reason for the framers of the Constitution to

exclude

publishers

is

concern

the

about

preventing

booksellers' monopoly. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
England, it was the booksellers who not only controlled the
access to, but also monopolized the price of, the books. An

author,

ordinarily,

must spend

a

lot of

time

for

just

reproducing one work. A publisher, on the other hand, can
control the distribution of many works from different authors
at the same time. This is why the Copyright Clause excludes

the publishers from copyright protection. 62

However, the functional system of the book trade is that

the

author

publication. 63

62

assigns

Without

copyright
the

to

the

publishers,

publisher

there

is

for

no

See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand.
1, at 13-19 (1987).

L. REV.
63

Because the authors must assign their copyright to the publishers
for publication of the works, an unfortunate influence is the under
development of the authors' moral rights. The implication of the
Copyright Clause seems to be that the exclusive right constitutes the
authors' whole right of the work once the work is published. However,
after the authors assign copyright to the publishers, they should still
have the right to protect the attribution and integrity of the works
If the subject protected in the Copyright Clause includes the
publishers as well as the authors, it may be easier to distinguish the
difference between the rights derived from creation (the authors'
rights) and the rights derived from publication (the publishers'
rights). Authors' moral rights might be developed earlier and better.
About the development of the authors' moral rights, see generally
Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 163-76.
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publication. The users get no access to the works. A better

legislation is to regulate the publishers' rights rather than
exclude or ignore it. 64

The
statute,

1790

Copyright Act,

the

first

federal copyright

secured copyright for both the authors

publishers. 65

All

the

and the

subsequent Copyright Acts provided

copyright protection for the publishers, including the 1976
Act. The best way to promote learning should accommodate the

three conflict rights

the authors' rights, the publishers'

rights, and the users' rights

In

conclusion,

promote

the

in a balanced level.

the purpose of American copyright

progress

of

learning

by

is

to

providing authors

exclusive right within a limited period of time under the
premise that it will not encroach on the public interests.
The public interests are explicitly protected by the First

Amendment of the Constitution as free speech rights.

64 To establish the rules
about the publishers' rights, the most
important thing is to clarify the nature of copyright as a statutorygrant right. See infra text accompanying notes 83-107. If the copyright
owners' exclusive rights are limited, the possibility of the
publishers' overcontrol on the book trade is comparatively low. The
other way is to use the First Amendment as an aid to restraint of the
Congressional power on granting rights to publishers. See infra text
accompanying notes 66-82.
65 The title of the 17 90 Copyright Act stated that it was "An act for
the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts,
and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the
times therein mentioned." 1 Stat. 124 (1845).
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B. The Free Speech Rights in the First

Amendment

Due to the English history of censorship and press control,

the

purpose

of

the

First

Amendment

is

to

prevent any

unreasonable control on the flow of information.

Although the First Amendment was adopted in

17 90,

the

development of the free speech concepts were relatively late.
Not until recent decades did the Supreme Court develop the
free speech rights as the right to hear,

speak,

read,

and

print. It is a public's right of access to and dissemination
of ideas.

66

(1). The Relationship between Copyright and the Free Speech

Rights

Copyright and the free speech rights are related because both
of them deal with the same subject matter

information. The

purpose of the First Amendment is to promote the flow of
information by forbidding Congress on making laws to abridge
the freedom of speech and of the press. The Copyright Clause,

however,

gives Congress the power to grant the exclusive

proprietary right to authors. The use of the exclusive right

may constitute infringement.

It

seems that the exclusive

right is a restraint on the free speech rights.

66

That the free speech rights include the right of access is a modern
of

concept which was established by the following cases: Board
Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) and Virginia State Bd.

Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

of
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In fact, copyright and the free speech rights complement

to

each

other.

The

free

speech rights protect people's

freedom of speech and print. The creations and distribution
of the works would not be censored. The purpose of copyright

for the progress of learning would be promoted.

The free

speech rights can protect the freedom of copyright.
On the other hand, the granting of copyright to authors is
a

method to improve the free speech rights

.

The purpose of

giving authors the exclusive right in a limited time is for

encouraging their creations and distribution. If there are
more works created and distributed, the public would have
more opportunities to read and hear. Besides this,

at the

time the Copyright Clause was codified, the "exclusive right"

meant the exclusive printing, publishing and vending right
only.

67

Authors do not have the absolute exclusive right to

control the works.

Although giving copyright to authors

sacrifices part of the public interests temporarily,

it

promotes the flow of information in the long run. Copyright
does not abridge the free speech rights, but improves them.

Moreover, the Copyright Clause is a promotion of learning
clause. Promotion of learning requires a right of access to

the works. The Copyright Clause has free speech values. This

point of view can also be verified by the history.

The

Copyright Clause was enacted from the title of the Statute of
Anne. There were four provisions in the Statute of Anne which

protected the right of access. Section
67

See supra text accompanying notes 53-60

I

limited the terms of
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copyright and created the public domain. 68 Section IV was a

price-control provision. 69

Section V

required

that

nine

copies of each books should be delivered to the Stationers'

Company for the use of the libraries of nine universities. 70

Section VII removed the restrictions on the importation,
vending,

or selling of books in foreign language printed

beyond the seas. 71 The Statute of Anne had free speech
values. The Copyright Clause has this free speech values and

does not conflict with the First Amendment. 72

When Congress legislates the copyright acts according to
the language of the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment is
an aid to prevent Congress from enacting laws which violate

the public interests. Congress did it well in the nineteenth

century.

However,

the

application of

copyright to

new

technology of communication corrupts the existed balance
between copyright and the free speech rights in the twentieth
century.

68

8

69

id. siv.

70

id.

SV.

71

id.

svn.

Anne, c. 19, SI.

72 About the relationship between copyright and the free speech rights
see Patterson & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 123-28.
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(2). The Development of the Free Speech Rights

Before examining the achievement of the free speech rights,
it is necessary to clarify the priority between copyright and

the free speech rights. Copyright is an exception to the free

speech rights

.

The free speech rights are people

'

s

political

rights which protect the public interests. Theoretically,

interests

public

are

more

important

than

individual's

proprietary interests. Furthermore, the proprietary right is
the people's

one of

political rights which need

to

be

recognized and enforced by the government. The priority of
the free speech rights is superior to authors' copyright. The

authors

'

proprietary right should be protected under the

premise that they will not endanger the public interests. 73
In the nineteenth century, both legislative and judicial

development implemented the right of public access. Congress

legislated that publication was a requirement for obtaining

The

copyright. 74

courts

developed

three

fundamental

principles to protect public's right of access. In Wheaton v.
Peters, 15 the Supreme Court decided that an author can only

have the rights granted by the statute after publication.
73

See id. at 131

In the first copyright act of 1790, section 3 required that the
author or proprietor "shall, within two months from the date (of
deposit a printed copy of the title of the work) thereof, cause a copy
of the. .record (of the work) to be published in one or more of the
newspapers printed in the United States, for the space of four weeks."
1 Stat.
124 §3 (1845). This publication requirement is eliminated by
the 1976 Copyright Act.
74

.

75

33 U.S.

(8

Pet.) 591 (1834)

37

statutory-monopoly principle rejected the author's

This

absolute

rights

access. 76

The

on

Supreme

established

the

work

the

Court

and

ensured the right

later

Baker

in

limited-protection

v.

principle

of

Selden 11

which

distinguished ideas from expression and protected the users
right of using ideas. 78 The fair use principle was founded by

Justice

Story

in

Folsom

v.

Marsh. 19

This

case

made

a

distinction between a use of the work and a use of the
copyright, thus prevented from binding individual's personal
use upon the fair use restriction. 80 These principles protect

the free speech rights even though they are developed as

copyright law. 81
The free speech became an issue in the twentieth century.

There are three development in the twentieth century which
endangers the right of access. One is the expansion of the
copyright owners' exclusive rights to encompass the right to

copy.

Another

requirement.

the

is

The

elimination

76

See generally Patterson

77

101 U.S.

78

See generally Patterson

79

9

80

See generally Patterson

99

Fed. Cas.

fair use doctrine

codification of the

further endangers the users

'

the publication

of

right of access

& Lindberg,

supra note

1,

at 61-64.

lindberg,

supra note

1,

at 60-61.

(1879).

342

(No.

&

4901)(C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
&

lindberg,

supra note

1,

at 66-68.

About the American experience of free speech rights, see Patterson,
Free Speech and Copyright, supra note 62, at 33-36.
81

38

The most important method to save the foundering free
speech rights is to have a unified theory about the nature of

copyright. For promoting the flow of information, copyright
should be regulatory in nature and construed as a statutorygrant right. An effective distinction between the use of the

work and the use of copyright is the basis for protecting the
users'

right of access. 82 The argument about the nature of

copyright is the most controversial issue in the copyright
history.

82

See Patterson

&

LINDBERG,

supra note

1,

at 132-33.

CHAPTER

4

THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT

The Copyright Clause of

the U.S.

Constitution does not

explicitly endorse or reject the author's common-law right. 83
The 1790 Copyright Act, provided no conclusive answer about

this

issue,

either.

The nature of copyright remained as

undecided at the beginning of American copyright legislation.
The issue of the common-law copyright did not come into
focus until 1834 when Wheaton v. Peters was brought to the

Supreme Court.

84

Wheaton v. Peters was viewed as the American

counterpart of Donaldson

v.

Beckett. Its holding exempted the

application of the common-law copyright from the federal
copyright system. Since the common-law copyright was still
effective in the state law after the Wheaton case, the debate
about the nature of copyright had not ceased.

The most unfortunate result of this controversy is the

inability to distinguish the use of the work and the use of
copyright. The use of the material object in which the work
is

embodied is

exclusive

a

rights

use of

the work;

the exercise of the

the

copyright

owners

of

is

a

use

of

83 About this issue, see Howard B. Abrams
The Historic Foundation of
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29
WAYNE L. REV. 1119, at 1174-78 (1983).
,

84

33 U.S.

(8

Pet.) 591 (1834).

39

40

copyright.

85

This distinction is the basis for deciding the

scope of personal use. The failure to distinguish between the

use

of

work

the

and

the

use

of

copyright

impedes

the

distinction between the personal use by a consumer and the
fair use by a competitor.

86

The nature of copyright in the 1976 Copyright Act is a

statutory-grant right. This statute, basically, reflects the
purpose of copyright as the promotion of learning. Since the

copyright owners still act as copyright is their own private

property right, a detailed explanation about the nature of
copyright is thus necessary and important.

A.

Wheaton v. Peters

Richard Peters, after succeeded Henry Wheaton as the reporter
for

the U.S.

Supreme Court,

announced a circular about

publishing the whole series of the decisions argued and

adjudged in the Supreme Court
January term,

from its

organization to

1827, which might include the cases

published by Wheaton.

already

Wheaton and his publisher, Robert

Donaldson, sent a plea to prevent Peters' plan, but Peters

ignored it and published his Condensed Reports.

The third

volume of the Condensed Reports contained some cases reported

earlier in Wheaton

85

See Patterson

86

Id. at 197-200.

'

s

& Lindberg,

Reports. Wheaton and Donaldson filed a

supra note

1,

at 120-22.
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bill in the Circuit Court in Pennsylvania for seeking an
injunction against Peters and his publisher, John Grigg. 87

Wheaton and Donaldson claimed a copyright in the Wheaton's
Reports both under the copyright statute and the common law.

Peters denied that his Condensed Reports was a violation of
the complainants' rights. He averred that: first, Wheaton and

Donaldson had not performed the requisites of the Copyright
Act; second, there was no common-law copyright in the United

States; and third, Whea ton's Reports was not a work entitled
to copyright, either by the statute or by the common law.

Judge Hopkinson of the circuit court first considered the
complainants' right under the statute. The evidence provided
by the plaintiff was insufficient to prove a valid compliance
of

the

fourth

section of

the

1790

Copyright Act which

required a delivery of a copy of the work to the secretary of
state within six months after publication. 88 The question was

whether this compliance was indispensable for an author to
obtain statutory copyright. According to the decision of Ewer
87
88

See Patterson, HISTORICAL Perspective, supra note

6,

at 203-04.

There were four conditions to be complied with for obtaining
copyright protection. Section 3 of the 1790 Act required an author to
deposit the title of the book in the clerk's office. 1 Stat. 124-26 §3
(1845). Then, according to §1 of the 1802 Act, it was necessary to
insert the copy of the record made by the clerk in the page of the book
next to the title. 2 Stat. 171 §1. Section 3 of the 1790 Act further
required a public notice in the newspapers within two months after
deposit for the space of four weeks. Section 4 of the 1790 Act
requested an author to deliver a copy of the work to the secretary of
state within six months after publication. 1 Stat. 124-26 §4. The
testimony for Wheaton alleged that eighty copies of Wheaton 's Reports
were delivered to the department of state. The court thought that this
delivery under the reporter's act did not exonerate Wheaton from
depositing a copy of his work required by the 1790 Copyright Act.
Wheaton failed to comply with §4 of the 1790 Act. Wheaton v. Peters, 29
Fed. Cas. 862, at 863-65 (No. 17,486) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832).

42

Coxe, ss

v.

circuit

the

court ruled that the

statutory

provisions was essential, rather than merely directory, to be

complied with for an author to obtain his or her title.

About the claim of author's common-law copyright, the
court,

based on the reasoning of

U.S.

v.

Worrall, 90 ruled

that there was no common law existed in the U.S.

federal

government. In the case of state common-law right, the court

even though the states

said that,

followed the English

common-law system, there were no states adopted the whole of

common

the

law

England

from

every

and

states

adopted

different provisions because of different regional needs.
Even in England, the issue about the existence of the commonlaw copyright had not been settled. Judge Hopkinson concluded

that no common-law copyright was set up "in the colonies, in
the states, or in the United States,..." 91 He dissolved the

injunction and dismissed the bill. 92

Wheaton appealed to the Supreme Court. 93 The only point
unanimously agreed to by the judges of the Supreme Court was
that the court's opinions can not become the subject matter

the notes,

However,

of copyright.

syllabus,

summaries and

index about the cases still could be copyrighted. 94 The two
89

8

90

28 Fed. Cas.

91

Wheaton v. Peters, 29 Fed. Cas. 862, 872.

92

917

Fed. Cas.

Wheaton v.

774

(No.
(No.

Peters,

4,584)

(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824).

16,766)

29

Fed.

(C.C.D. Pa 1798).

Cas.

17,486)

862

(No.

591

(1834).

1832).
93

Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.

94

33 U.S.

(8

(8 Pet.)

Pet.) 591, 698g (Brightly

's

3rd ed.

)

(C.C.E.D.

Pa,
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main issues in this case were: first, does an author have a
right at common law after publication? and second, do the

conditions required by the statute have to be

strictly

complied with for securing copyright?
The opinion of the majority, written by Justice McLean,
was based on the theory that copyright is a monopoly. The

author has no right to hold a perpetual property in the
ideas, instruction or entertainment afforded by the book. 95

Under this premise,

the majority

common-law copyright of the U.S.

held that there

is

no

federal system unless the

federal legislation explicitly adopt it. Since the federal

government is composed of many states which have different
local usage, customs and common law, any federal principles

have to be clearly embodied. The plaintiff's assertion of

common-law right should be determined under the
Pennsylvania.

After

discussing Millar

v.

law

Taylor96

of

and

95

The following paragraph can express this basic assumption of the
majority: "That an author, at common law, has a property in his
manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of
it, or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by
its publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very deferent right
from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the
future publication of the work, after the author shall have published
it to the world.

The argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the product
of his labour as any other member of society, cannot be controverted.
And the answer is, that he realises this product by the transfer of his
manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when first published.
A book is valuable on account of the matter it contains, the ideas
it communicates, the instruction or entertainment it affords. Does the
author hold a perpetual property in these? Is there an implied contract
by every purchaser of his book, that he may realise whatever
instruction or entertainment which the reading of it shall give, but
shall not write out or print its contents." See 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,
at 657.
96

4

Burr. 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201

(1769)
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Donaldson

v.

Beckett, 91

the

majority

thought

that

the

existence of author's common-law right in England was still
in doubt. Even if the author's common-law right were shown to

exist

in

England,

no

one

can contend that Pennsylvania

adopted all the provisions of English common law. Moreover,

long before the

issue of

author's common-law right was

emerged, the colony of Pennsylvania was settled. The commonlaw copyright had not been recognized in Pennsylvania.

The basic premise of the dissenters was that an author, as
a creator, had a

natural-law property right on the work. The

dissenting opinions, by Justice Thompson and Justice Baldwin,

relied on the decision of Millar

v.

Taylor and thought that

an author had a common-law copyright. Donaldson v. Beckett,

based on the Burrow's Reports, did not overrule Millar

v.

Taylor, but affirmed it. The copyright statute was enacted to

protect an existing right, but not to create it.

About the second question, the majority held that strict
compliance of the statutory requirements was essential to a

perfect title.

It

was not

appropriate for the court to

determine the requirements were important or not, but the
legislature. However, the court was not satisfied with the

circuit court's finding about whether Wheaton deposited a
copy of his book in the state secretary's office,

so it

remanded to a jury of the circuit court to decide this fact.
The case was reversed.

97 4 Burr. 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. 257;
Pari. Hist. 953 (1813).

1

Eng. Rep.

837

(1774);

17

Cobbett

'
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The

requirements

dissenters,

of

the

statute,

according

to

the

were partly mandatory and partly directory.

Requiring a strict compliance was not equitable to Wheaton

who enjoyed copyright peacefully for a long time. Even if

Wheaton

did

not

completely

comply

with

the

statutory

conditions, his copyright had not expired. The Congress did
not intend to make these requirements indispensable.

Wheaton v. Peters settled the concept of copyright as a

statutory-grant monopoly.

This

result

is

necessary

for

promoting the purpose of copyright. Regulating the rights
between authors, entrepreneurs and users through legislation
is the best way to ensure the promotion of learning. 98 The

copyright owners

'

absolute control on the work will become an

obstacle of the progress of learning. Copyright should be a
statutory-grant right.

The defect of

the

Wheaton case was

that the majority

opinion did not speak with determination on the point that
the common-law copyright did not exist in England because

Donaldson

Beckett

v.

rejected

it.

The

reasoning that

Pennsylvania did not adopt the English common-law copyright
seemed to imply that the common-law copyright was recognized
in England." This misinterpretation of Donaldson v. Beckett

reinforced the confusion about the nature of copyright.
98
99

See Patterson

&

LiNDBERG,

supra note

1,

at 122,

This misreading of Donaldson v. Beckett was probable because of the
over reliance on the Burrow's Reports. In fact, the Burrow's Reports
did not contain the whole process and content of Donaldson v. Beckett.
In Burrow's Reports, Millar v. Taylor consisted of over one hundred
pages and Donaldson v. Beckett only ten pages. Donaldson v. Beckett was
just like an appendix of Millar v Taylor. It was easy to be misled on

46

B. The Nature of American Copyright

Theoretically, Wheaton

v.

Peters had already mandated the

nature of American copyright as a statutory-grant right.
However, the common-law copyright did not stop its influence

on later judicial decisions, which created confusion about
the nature of copyright. The reason was partly because of the

misconception about

the

existence

of

the

common-law

copyright. Since an author had the common-law right before
publication, this caused the assumption that an author just

transferred his or her common-law right to a statutory-grant
right after publication. Plus the misunderstanding about the

existence of the common-law copyright in England, the result
was the claim that common law was the theoretical basis of

statutory copyright. Copyright had a dual and contradictory
theoretical basis and thus the confusion about the nature of

copyright was enhanced.
In fact, the common-law copyright had never existed in the

Anglo-American copyright history. Copyright originated and
continuously functioned as a statutory-grant right. The issue
of an author's common-law right was always litigated under

the

situation

that

there was

a

copyright

statute.

The

the point that the House of Lords agreed with the decision of Millar v.
Taylor and recognized the common-law copyright. A complete report of
Donaldson v. Beckett is in CoJbbett's Parliamentary History which
demonstrates that the lords rejected the common-law copyright. See
Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 37-38. See also Abrams, supra note
83, at 1183-84.
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publication was always a requirement for obtaining copyright.
[Not until

eliminated.

the 1976 Act,

the publication requirement was

Copyright was obtained because of publication,

]

but not creation. Creation of a work was a necessary but not

sufficient condition for obtaining copyright. The common-law
copyright had never existed except the five years between the

Millar case and the Donaldson case.

common-law copyright by Donaldson
v.

The rejection of the

Beckett 100 and Wheaton

v.

Peters 101 made this right a stillborn concept. After the

decision of Wheaton,

it

was

the

the common-law

name of

copyright itself which misled that there was another kind of

copyright existed other than the statutory copyright. The
common-law copyright, nonetheless, was just a name and played
no role after a work was published. 102
This controversy about the nature of copyright impeded the

development of the subordinate rules

.

The most deplorable

result may be the difficulty to distinguish the difference
between copyright and the work which copyright is subject to.

Following the natural-law theory, it is no need to have any

distinction between copyright and the work,

since all the

interests upon the work belong to the author and (or)

copyright owner even after publication.

Any use

of

the

the

copyrighted work, except those conferred by the statute, may

100

97. 4 Burr. 2408; 98 Eng. Rep.
Cobbett's Pari. Hist. 953 (1813).
101

33 U.S.

102

See PATTERSON

(8

Pet.)
&

591

257;

1

Eng.

Rep.

(1834).

LINDBERG,

supra note

1,

at 118-120.

837

(1774);

17
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constitute infringement.
statutory-grant theory,

However,

if

complying with

the

the copyright owner has only the

rights granted by the statute. Other rights are free for use

by society. A valid distinction between copyright and the

work plays an important role in the distinction between the
use of copyright and the use of the work.

The 1976 Copyright Act finally determines the nature of

copyright by abolishing the common-law copyright. Section 301

makes copyright exclusively a matter of

federal

law and

rejects the application of common law and statutes of any
State. 103 Copyright thus is governed by a single sovereign.

Before the 1976 Act, ownership of the work was governed by
the state law and ownership of copyright by the federal law.

The federal courts had no legal basis to separate copyright
and the work, since the rights conferred by ownership of the

work was a matter of state law. After the 1976 Act makes
copyright solely a matter of federal law, the work is also
governed by the federal government. Section 202 then makes a

distinction between ownership of a copyright and ownership of
any material object.

104

However, the 1976 Act does not have any provisions to deal

with the ownership of the work explicitly. Since an author
creates the work, the only logical candidate to own the work
is

the

author.

Under

the

1976

Act,

an

author obtains

copyright of the work at the moment when he or she has fixed
103

17 U.S.C.

104

Id. §202.

§301

(1994).
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the ideas in a tangible medium of expression.

105

That is, an

author owns both copyright and the work upon creation.
Because copyright is distinct from the work, the assignment
of

copyright does not mean the assignment of the work.

Moreover, §203 gives the author a termination right which is

inalienable and limited to the author or heirs. 106 Just like
a

reversionary interest in real property, this termination

interest needs a proprietary basis for claiming the right.
The proprietary basis of copyright has to be the work.

It

implies that the author owns the work because he or she has
the inalienable termination right. The ownership of the work

remains in the author.

nature

The

of

copyright

is

a

statutory-grant right.

Copyright owners can only have the rights granted by the

statute and

other

belong

rights

to

the

public.

This

statutory-grant theory requires a valid distinction between
copyright and the work. The use of copyright and the use of
the work are totally two different things. The distinction

between

copyright

and

the

analyzing the users' rights.

105

id. §102(a).

106

Id.

work

is

just

the

basis

for

107

§203.

107 There is a great explanation about the
Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 109-22.

nature of copyright in

CHAPTER

5

THE ENDANGERED RIGHT OF ACCESS

The purpose and nature of copyright are both designed for

protecting the users'

right of access in order to promote

learning. But the development of copyright in the twentieth

century tends to expand copyright owners' exclusive rights,
which unfortunately endangers the users' right of access.
In the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress expanded the copyright

owners

'

exclusive rights by adding the right to copy in the

grant-of-rights section. 108 Later in the 1976 Act, copyright

owners were given the right to reproduce the copyrighted

works in copies or phonorecords

109

The assumption derived

from this expansion was that the copyright owners had a

complete and absolute right to copy a work, which inhibit
users

'

right of access to copy the copyrighted work for

personal use.

The elimination of the publication requirement and the

codification of the fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act further
endangers users' right of access. To accommodate copyright to

the

new

communications

technology,

the

publication

requirement is eliminated because this kind of works
108

17 U.S.C.

109

17

§l(a)

(1909 Act).

U.S.C. §106 (1994).
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are

51

performed rather than published. 110 The long-term safeguard
of the right of access vanished.

codification

The

of

the

fair

use

doctrine enables

copyright owners to claim that any use of the copyrighted
works should be governed under the fair use restrictions,
including personal use. 111 The result is a personal users'
tax.

subordinate principles

Since the

decided according to the policies,

and

rules

shall

be

the interpretation of

these three changes will be based on the purpose and nature
of copyright. This chapter will explain the right to copy and

the elimination of publication requirement. The personal use

and the effect of the codification of the fair use will be

discussed in the next chapter.

A. The Right to Copy

The verb "to copy" has two meanings. It means to duplicate an

original

(for example,

with a photocopying machine or a

videotape recorder) or to imitate an original by using it as
a model

(for example,

to translate,

digest,

or abridge a

copyrighted work). 112
This distinction can be clearly explained when we examine

copyright in the nineteenth century. Before the 1909 Act,
110

id. §102(a).

111

id.

112

See Patterson

§107.
&

Lindberg,

supra note

1,

at 146-47
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copyright owners

had only the right to print,

and vend the work. 113 Another

publish,

reprint,

author could not

duplicate the copyrighted work for sale, but could freely
imitate the work through the way of abridging, digesting, or

translating. Individual users had no interests in copying by

imitation the copyrighted work, but could duplicate it. Since

buy

to

cheaper and more convenient than to

book was

a

duplicate it, individual users' duplication was thus not an

Even if someone spent a lot of time and energy to

issue.

duplicate a book by hand, it would not affect the market.
The new technology is the reason that makes the right to

copy an issue. The photocopying machine and the videotape
recorder give users a convenient and cheap method to copy the

copyrighted works. Copyright owners claim that their profit
is seriously harmed by individual users'

now

is

what

is

the

scope

of

the

copying. The issue

copyright

owners'

reproduction right?
The key point to the scope of the right to copy is whether
114

If it

is a dependent right exercised for vending the work,

users

this right is a dependent or an independent right.

will also have the right to copy within a reasonable scope.
it

If

is

strength,

an independent right with absolute and complete

any users'

copying of the copyrighted work may

constitute infringement.

113

1

Act)
114

Stat. 124
(1845).

§1

(1790 Act)

(1845);

4

Stat.

436

§1

(1831

See L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, supra note

2,

Revision

at 260.
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(1).

In the 1909 Copyright Act

Section 1(a) of the 1909 Copyright Act gave copyright owners
the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, copy,

and

vend the copyrighted work." 115 The right to copy was a new
right for the copyright owners. The purpose for Congress to

add this

right was

for protecting the art works

on the

market

Before the 1909 Act, the proprietor of book, map, or chart
had the right to print, reprint, and publish the work. But
the right to publish could not provide enough protection for

the works of art, the Congress then gave the art works the
right to copy the work in order to provide reasonable chance
for the art works to obtain profit on the market. 116
115

17 U.S.C.

§l(a)

(1909 Act).

116 The House report on the bill that became the 1909 Act said that the
addition of the right to copy was just an adoption of old phraseology,
which did not change the phraseology of section 4 952 of the Revised
Statutes. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes was as follows:

"The author, inventor, designer or proprietor of any book,
map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut,
print, or photograph or negative thereof, or of a painting,
drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs
intended to be perfected as works
of
the
fine
arts, .. .shall .. .have the sole liberty of printing, reprinting,

publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing,
"
vending the same
26 Stat. 1106, at 1107 (1891).

and

The meaning of section 4952 of the Revised Statutes was that one
could have the right to print, reprint, and publish a book, map, or
chart, to execute and finish models or designs, or to copy an
engraving, cut, print, photograph, painting, drawing, chromo, statue,
or statuary. The right to copy applied to works of art only.
Sections 4964 and 4965 of the Revised Statutes which distinguished
the conduct that infringed a book from that infringing upon other kinds
of works supported this interpretation. Section 4964 stated that to
print, publish, or import a book without the consent of the copyright

54

However, the right to copy was granted in the grant-ofrights section. Supposedly, it applied to all kind of works.

No matter the right to copy applied to all works or the art
works only, the purpose of this right was for protecting the

work on the market, just like the purpose of the right to
print, reprint, and publish was.

The purpose of the right to print, reprint, and publish

was for vending the works since the stationers'

copyright.

During the era of the stationers' copyright, the printers had
the right to print and reprint,

117

and the booksellers had

the right to publish. The purpose of these three rights was
for vending the books on the market.

reprint,

The right of print,

or import in the Statute of Anne was

vending the works.

The meaning of the

right

still
to

for

print,

reprint, and publish from the 1790 Act to the 1909 Act kept
as the same. This is the market principle which manifests the

purpose of copyright as protecting the works for the market.

This principle continues to function as one of the major
principles of American copyright. 118
owner was an infringement. 2 6 Stat. 1106, at 1109; see also The Revised
Statutes of the United States, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 957-60, at 959
(1878). Section 4965 said that to engrave, etch, work, copy, print,
publish, or import copyrighted works other than a book without
permission from the copyright owner was an infringement. Ibid. It
implied that to copy a book was not an infringement of copyright. The
right to copy was a general right but applied only to the works of art.
117

copyright was
The custom of the book trade during the stationers
to print the first version of the book at the amount of 1,200 copies or
less, so it might often reguire reprinting. This was why the printers
had not only the right of print, but also the right of reprint. See
Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 65.
'

118

Id.

at 64-66,
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The scope of the right to copy could not be broader than
the scope of the right to print, reprint, and publish. So the

purpose of the right to copy was also for vending the works.
The exact meaning of the exclusive rights in the 1909 Act,
thus, was the right to print and vend, the right to reprint

and vend, the right to publish and vend,

and the right to

copy and vend.

The unfortunate result of adding the right to copy in

section

1(a)

as

general

a

right was

that

it

gave

the

copyright owners an excuse to claim that their right to copy
was a complete and absolute right. Actually, when the 1909

Act was enacted, the photocopying machine had not invented
yet. There was no reason for the Congress to give copyright

owners

the

right

to

copy

to

prevent users

'

copying by

photocopying machine at the prephotocopying era. The right to
copy in the 1909 Act was a dependent right for vending the
works.

(2).

119

In the 1976 Copyright Act

Section

106

owners 120

of

five

the

1976

exclusive

Copyright
rights:

Act

(1)

to

gives copyright

reproduce

the

About the explanation of the meaning of the right to copy in the
1909 Act, see Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, supra note 2, at 25860. See also Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 81-85.
119

120 The definition of the "copyright owner" in §101 of the 1976 Act is
with respect to "any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, and refers to the owner of that particular right." 17 U.S.C.

§101

(1994).

56

copyrighted work in copies;
(3)

(2)

to prepare derivative works;

to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the

public;

(4)

publicly.

to perform it publicly;

and (5)

to display it

121

Among these five rights,

distribution right,

the adaptation right,

public performance right,

public

and public

display right are granted for marketing the work. The issue
is whether the reproduction right is granted for marketing

the work or for implementing the other four rights

The right to reproduce in the

1976 Act is

right for implementing the other four rights.

a dependent

To prepare

derivative works, the copyright owner must copy the original

work by using it as a model, that is, by imitating it. For
121

Id.
§106. In the 1976 Copyright Act, there is no manifest
definition about the "exclusive rights," but it has the definitions
about other key terminology of section 106 in section 101.
A "derivative work" is "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
f ictionalization
motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
derivative work."
To "perform" a work means "to recite, render, play, dance, or act
it,... in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
,

audible.
To "display" a work means "to show a copy of it,... in the case of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images
nonsequentially
To perform or display a work "publicly" means "(1) to perform or
display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or
process[], whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times."
Id. §101.
.
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distributing a work to the public,

it

necessary

is

to

reproduce the original work in copies by duplication. For the
same reason, to exercise the public performance right or the

public display right, the copyright owner must duplicate the

original work in copies or phonorecords

necessary to duplicate

repeated

and wide

a

public

For example, it is

.

motion picture
performance,

in

or

copies

for

to duplicate

individual images of the motion picture in copies for public

display. The right to reproduce functions to implement the
right of adaptation, public distribution, public performance,
and public display.

The argument that the reproduction right is an independent

right does not possess a sound theoretical ground when we
explain it in light of the whole grant-of -rights section. In
§106, the distribution right, the performance right, and the

display

right

are

exercised publicly.

displays

a

protected
If

only

when

the

an user distributes,

copyrighted work

privately,

rights

are

performs, or

it

is

not

an

infringement of copyright. If the reproduction right is an

independent right with absolute power,

no matter what the

reason an user reproduces the copyrighted work,

it will

constitute an infringement. The copyright owners' exclusive
rights would be expanded unreasonably to the extent that an
user's reproduction for private distribution, performance, or

display

constitutes

an

infringement.

The

statutory

limitations imposed on the exclusive rights would be negated
under this kind of wrong interpretation of the right to copy.

58

The reproduction right is and should be a dependent right

when §106 is interpreted as an integrated whole. 122

There are two kinds of rights in §106.

The adaptation

right, public distribution right, public performance right,

and public display right are subject rights which can be

independently exercised for implementing the function of
copyright

marketing the work for profit. The reproduction

right is a predicate right which is dependent in nature for

implementing the function of the subject rights.

This

kind of

interpretation reflects

the purpose of

copyright for promoting learning and the nature of copyright
as a statutory-grant right.

Since the public interests is

superior to the copyright owners' private interests,

123

the

scope of exclusive right can not be broader than the extent

that the copyright owners have unreasonable monopoly to
control the market. The method to prevent copyright owners'

monopoly is to keep the works provided on the market with a

reasonable price.
right,

even

the right to copy is an independent

If

though

the

work

is

not

available

with

a

reasonable price, personal users can not duplicate it. Thus,
the copyright owners

'

monopoly would be enhanced and the

purpose of copyright would be inhibited.
The nature of copyright is that copyright is a statutory-

grant right. Copyright owners can only have the exclusive

122

See Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, supra note

123

See supra text accompanying notes 43-82.

2,

at 260-61
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rights granted by the statute.

124

If the right to copy is an

independent right with exclusive and absolute power, it would

override the public limitation that §106

imposed on the

distribution right, performance right, and display right. The
right to copy should be a dependent right.

A reasonable conclusion as to the scope of the right to
copy is that this right is a dependent right for implementing
the subject rights.

an user's copying is

for private

reasons without exercising any subject rights,

it does not

If

constitute an infringement. That is, personal users have the
right to reproduce the copyrighted works, since it does not
use copyright but only use the work.

B. The

Elimination of the Publication Requirement

According to §102

(a)

of the 1976 Copyright Act,

copyright

comes into existence while the work is "fixed in any tangible

medium of expression." 125

after

the

work

is

Authors obtain copyright right

created

and

fixed.

The

publication

requirement as a quid pro quo for copyright protection is
eliminated.

This

change

communications
124

is

for

protecting copyright of the

technology,

especially

for

new

television

See supra text accompanying notes 83-107.

125 17 U.S.C. §102(a). The content of §102(a) is as follows: "Copyright
protection subsists, .. .in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device...."
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broadcast.

The

marketing method

of

the

communications

technology is to transmit the work through public airwaves.
The transmission is a kind of performance, which is different
from the traditional publication. Publication assures users'

access to the works, however, performance threats the right
of access.

Print materials require publication in order to obtain

profit even though publication is not a requirement

for

copyright protection. Publication makes print materials at
least be available on the library shelves. It ensures not
only the contemporary accessibility to the copyrighted works
but also the future availability for the public domain.

126

However, the performance of a work does not guarantee the

subsequent

availability of

the

works.

After

a

work

is

performed, it may not be published on the market, may not be

available on the library shelf, and may be erased after the
performance. Copyright owners obtain copyright protection and
a profit through the initial performance,

and still control

the further accessibility to the works. 127

This kind of protection for the electronic copyright is

detrimental to the constitutional purpose as the promotion of
learning. Learning requires access to the works. Distribution
of the works ensures the access.

The best way to promote

learning is to encourage the distribution but

126

See Patterson

127

Ibid.

& LiNDBERG,

supra note

1,

at 100.

not

only

61

encourage the creation of works.

128

The

purpose of

the

creation requirement is to prevent the works in the public

domain

been

under

copyright monopoly

repeatedly.

The

excessive protection which gives the copyright owners of the

electronic media the right to control the access

to

the

copyrighted works inhibit learning.

Television programs not only provide entertainment but
also shape public

opinion.

Its

role on

modern

life

is

significant. To broadcast in a rigid period of time without

future

availability derogates

explicit

rule

to

protect

the public

public's

right

interests.

An

access

is

of

necessary. The Supreme Court protects individual users' right

to copy

the motion pictures

broadcast on television by

videotape recorders for private use in Sony Corp. of America

Universal City Studios,

v.

Inc.

(the Betamax case). 129

A

further protection of the right of access by imposing the
duty on copyright owners to provide subsequent availability
of the works after performance is also vitally important for

the promotion of learning.
128

Copyright is a statutory-grant

at 49-50; see also Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
supra note 62, at 6-8.

Id.

Use,
129

480 F. Supp. 429 (CD. Cal
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). The Supreme Court held that
"manufacturers of home videotape recorders demonstrated a significant
likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who licensed
their works for broadcast on free television would not object to having
their broadcasts time shifted by private viewers and owners of
copyrights on television programs failed to demonstrate that time
shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential
market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works and therefore home
videotape recorder was capable of substantial noninfringing uses; thus,
manufacturers
sale of such equipment to general public did not
constitute contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights." 104
.

'

S.

Ct.

774, at 774.
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right

for promoting the public

interests,

but

proprietary right for protecting copyright owners
interests.

rather
'

a

private

CHAPTER

6

THE PERSONAL USE PRINCIPLE

There is no specific statutory rules about the personal
rights in the 1976 Act. The lack of statutory rules

users'

for personal use is probably because personal use had not

become an issue until the emergence of new technologies. The
source of personal users

the Constitution.

130

'

rights is the Copyright Clause of

The

purpose

of

copyright

Copyright Clause is to promote learning.

in

the

The assumption

follows that more use of the work makes greater promotion of
learning. Thus, protection of citizen's right to use the work
is necessary for attaining the constitutional purpose.

The

individual users' rights are protected by the Constitution.
The controversy about the personal users

individual

'

s

'

rights is the

right to copy the copyrighted works for private

reasons. The design of the 1976 Act makes this controversy

more complex.
owners'

Section 106 is the rule about the copyright

exclusive rights. 131 Following §106,

through 120 are limitations on exclusive rights.
of

design results

in

the

130

U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl.8.

131

17

132

Id.

U.S.C. §106 (1994)

sections
132

107

This kind

assumption that the copyright

.

§§107-120.

63

64

owners'

exclusive rights have absolute strength subject to

limitations only. Under this proposition, personal use is one
of the exception of the copyright owners'

exclusive rights,

rather than a right from the Constitution. 133

According to our analysis of the nature of copyright as a

statutory-grant right, copyright owners can have the right
granted by the statute only. 134 They can just have the rights

granted in section
dependent right.

135

106.

Their right to

reproduce

is

a

Personal users have the right to copy the

copyrighted works
The reason that really blurs the personal users

'

rights in

the 1976 Act is the codification of the fair use doctrine.

Section 107 says that the fair use of a copyrighted work is

not

an

infringement

of

copyright.

There

are

four

non-

exclusive criteria in this section to decide an use is fair
or

foul.

136

Since

personal users'

there

rights,

is

no

independent

rules

about

the assumption is that every use

should apply to those criteria to determine its legitimacy,
including personal use.
In fact,

personal use is different from fair use. There

are two different kind of users' rights: one is the fair use
of a copyright by an author, and another is the personal use

of a work by an individual. Personal use does not need to be
133

See Patterson

134

see SU pra text accompanying notes 83-107.

135

See supra text accompanying notes 112-124.

136 17

&

LlNDBERG,

U.S.C. §107 (1994).

supra note

1,

at 193-94.
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governed by the fair use criteria. Its scope of use should be
broader than the scope of fair use. 137

A. Fair Use

Fair use originated as a fair-competitive-use doctrine by

Folsom

v.

Copyright

Marsh. 138

Act

competitive

The

does

Fair

use.

competitive users

not

codification of

change
use

is

its

it

nature

designed

in
as

the

1976

a

fair

for protecting

right to use copyright of the copyrighted

'

works

(1). The Origin of Fair Use

The fair use doctrine was created by Justice Story in the

nineteenth century to supersede the fair abridgment doctrine.

Under the 1790 Copyright Act, a second author had the right
to freely abridge another author's work. The second author's

work was viewed as a new work without infringing the first
author's copyright.

137

See p atters on

138

9

139

Fed# CaSi

&

139

LINDBERG,

342

(

No

.

supra note

1,

at 193.

4901)(C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

Tne exclusive rights granted in the 1790 Copyright Act were the
"sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending..." 1 Stat. 124-26 (1845). Because copyright is a statutorygrant right, the copyright owner only had the right to print, reprint,
publish and vend the work. A second author's condensation of the
materials of the original work did not constitute a piracy of
copyright, since it did not employ the right of printing, reprinting,
publishing and vending.

66

In

1841,

Folsom

v.

Marsh was submitted to the Circuit

Court of Massachusetts in front of Justice Story. 140 The
relevant issue here was whether the defendant's abridgment of
the plaintiff's work was just. In this case, the defendant

derived 353 of the 866 pages from the plaintiff's twelvevolume biography of George Washington in writing his own two-

volume biography of the first president. 141 Justice Story
overruled defendant

'

s

defense of fair abridgment and imposed

three criteria to judge whether a use of the copyrighted work
is fair or not:

The question, then, is, whether this is a justifiable

use of

the original materials ,... In short,

often, in deciding questions of this sort,

we must

look to the

nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which
the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits,

or supersede the objects, of the original work.

142

140

When Folsom v. Marsh was submitted to the Circuit Court, the
involved Copyright Act was the Revision Act of 1831. 4 Stat. 436
(1845). Copyright owners' exclusive rights of the Revision Act of 1831
were the same as those rights in the 1790 Act. Id. §1.
141

The points made by the defendants were as follows:
The papers of George Washington are no subjects of copyright....
II. Mr. Sparks (the plaintiff) is not the owner of these papers,
but they belong to the United States, and may be published by any one.
III. An author has a right to quote, select, extract or abridge
from another, in the composition of a work essentially new." 9 Fed.
"I.

Cas. at 344.
142

9

Fed. Cas. at 34 8.
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The result of this case is the creation of the fair use

doctrine which enhanced copyright owners'

monopoly.

The

litigants in Folsom v. Marsh were both authors, which showed
the fact that fair use was created for balancing competitive

authors'

rights. The fair use doctrine was promulgated to

give a second author the right to use another author's
copyright. It was a fair-competitive-use doctrine.

(2). The Codification of the Fair Use Doctrine

The fair use doctrine served as a judicial rule to balance
the competitive authors' rights until the 1976 Copyright Act.
The dramatic change of the copyright concepts in the 1976 Act

creates a necessity for the codification of fair use. Both
the exemption of the common-law copyright which manifests

that the statute is the only source of copyright and the

protection

the

of

copyright owners

'

electronic

copyright

which

expands

monopoly results in the codification of the

fair use doctrine to prevent copyright become an obstacle for
learning.

Section 107 of the

1976 Act

articulates the fair use

doctrine, which reads as follows:

Section 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use

by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any

68

other means specified by that section, for purposes such
as

criticism,

(including

comment,

multiple

scholarship,

news

copies

or research,

is

reporting,
for

teaching

classroom

use),

not an infringement of

copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be

considered shall include
(1)

the purpose and character of the use,

including

whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2)

the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3)

the amount and substantiality of the portion used

in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4)

the effect of the use upon the potential market for

or value of the copyrighted work.

143

The defect of §107 is that it fails to distinguish copyright

and the work. The "use of a copyrighted work" seems to imply

that the use of a work is the same as the use of copyright.
It further implies that the work is the copyright owners'

property. Under this premise, there seems to possess no basis

to distinguish the competitors

'

use of copyright and the

consumers' use of the work.

Actually,

the

preamble of

§107

includes

examples of

personal use as well as fair use. Among the six examples
143

17 U.S.C. §107. About a detailed explanation of the four criteria
in §107, see generally Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 200-07.
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which is not an infringement of copyright, scholarship and
research is within the scope of personal use. However, to

articulate personal use together with fair use provides
copyright owners an excuse to claim that personal use must be
applied to the fair use criteria in §107.

The codification of fair use in §107 of the

1976

Act

almost negates its nature as a fair competitive use. Under
the Copyright Clause, Congress is empowered to grant authors

the

exclusive

right

to

publish,

that

is,

Congress can

legislate rules to protect the works against competitors'

unfair use only.

It is unconstitutional to give copyright

owners the right to control consumers

works.

The codification of

'

use of the copyrighted

fair use does

not change its

nature as a fair-competitive-use doctrine. Fair use is for
protecting competitors' right of use of the copyright.

144

B. Personal Use

Personal use is the use of the copyrighted works for one's
own private reasons, which includes the copying of the works.

The threat to the personal users' rights in the 1976 Act is
the codification of the fair use doctrine. Copyright owners,
thus, claim that personal use should be governed by the fair

use of §107. The issue is whether personal use should apply
to the fair use restraints.

144

See Patterson

&

LiNDBERG,

supra note

1,

at 102-06.
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The first thing we need to recall here is that fair use
was created and still functions to protect the use of the
copyright. The use of copyright entails the use of the work,

but the use of the work does not necessarily entail the use
of copyright. Just like the transfer of ownership of the work

does not of itself convey the copyright of that work,

and

vice versa. 145 This justifies the wording of §107 that the
"fair use of a copyrighted work"

is

not an infringement.

Since a fair use of the copyright also entails the use of the
work, the "copyrighted work" in §107 means the "fair use of

copyright of the copyrighted work." Congress can only have
the power to limit the use of copyright, but is not empowered

to limit the use of the work. Thus, section 107 governs just
the use of copyright.

The use of

the copyrighted works by individual users

employs the work only and does not employ the copyright. Just

like we reveal previously,

the reproduction right of the

copyright owners is a dependent right and individual users

have

the

right

to

copy

the

copyrighted works. 146

The

duplication of the copyrighted works by personal users does
not further employ copyright owners' adaptation right, public

distribution right,

public performance right,

or

public

display right. That is, individual users does not employ the

copyright of the copyrighted works. Only when a use employs
the copyright is it necessary to judge whether this use is
145

17 u.s.c.

146

See supra text accompanying notes 112-124.

§202.
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fair or not. The constitutional purpose of copyright is to

protect the copyright owners

'

rights against competitors

,

but

not to inhibit individual's use for learning. Basically, all
the personal use is intrinsically fair. Personal use is the
use of the work which does not need to apply to the fair use
restraints.

147

In the 1976 Act,

personal use.

there are some rules which utilize the

Section 107 itself protects the use of the

copyrighted works for scholarship and research.
subsection

148

Further in

and (e) of section 108, a library or archives

(d)

has the right to reproduce a copy of the copyrighted work

under the patron's request.

149

Since library or archives can

reproduce the copyrighted works

as

an

agent,

a

further

inference of §108 is that the patron himself or herself has
the same right to reproduce a copy of the copyrighted works
for his or her own file.

147

See Patterson

148

17

&

LlNDBERG,

supra note

1,

at 197-200.

U.S.C. §107.

149 Id.
§108. Section 108 (d) provides that a library or archives,
under the request of the user, can reproduce a copy of "no more than
one article or other contribution to a copyrighted collection or
periodical issue, or to a copy or phonorecord of a small part of any
other copyrighted work,..." Section 108 (e) permits a library or
archives to reproduce for the user the entire work, or a substantial
part of it if "the copyrighted work cannot be obtained at a fair

price, ..."
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Personal Use Criteria

C.

Since personal use is not inside the boundary of fair use,
its

copying of the copyrighted works

is

not

subject to

lengthy restrictions. Personal users can make a single copy
of the copyrighted works for their own private files,

but

this copy can not serve as a functional substitute to avoid
the purchase of the work which is now available on the market

with a reasonable price. 150

Another point is that personal users

'

right to copy is

less applicable to the works which is created for functional

purpose rather than for dissemination of knowledge. The
computer program and the architectural plan are two examples
The purpose of the copying of this kind of work is almost

undoubtedly for making the functional use of it. The value of
the original work would be diminished by this kind of use.

the purpose to protect

Under the constitutional scheme,
personal users'

avoid

the

rights is to promote learning, but not to

purchase

of

the

works.

If

the

use

the

of

copyrighted work falls outside the scope of personal use, it
should resort to fair use to decide whether this use is fair
or not.

151

An issue about the computer program in recent years is

that the copyright owners tend

to

make their own

self-

regulations on restricting the use of the works by users.
150

See Patterson

151

See id. at 194-95.

&

Lindberg,

supra note

1,

at 194.
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They

distribute

computer

programs

licenses, which restrict users'

with

shrink-wrapped

right to use the works even

to the extent that violate the statutory rules.

The main

point of their proclamation is to prohibit users'

right to

copy the computer programs.
computer programs,

Because the copying of

the

in most of the cases, will require the

copying of the entire works, the copyright owners thus ask
for special protection. This protection is to deny users'

right to copy, which is protected by section 107 of the 1976
Act. While the users can not unreasonably harm the copyright

owners'

right by copying the entire work,

the copyright

owners also have no basis to negate users' right to copy if
the work is not available on the market with a fair price.
The point to balance these two conflict rights is to have a

reasonable price of the works. 152

Personal use is the use of the work for private reasons.
It does not need to apply to the fair use restraints.

copying

by

personal

users

is

not

subject

to

The

length

restrictions, but it can not be made for public distribution
or as a functional substitute for the copyrighted work which
is currently available on the market with a reasonable price.

However, the copyright owners tend to treat personal use
as

one

of

the

fair

use

branches.

The

most

dangerous

proposition of the copyright owners is to impose a users' tax
on

individual's

copying

of

the

works.

This

inevitably

endangers personal users' right of access to the copyrighted
152

Id.

at 218-22.
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works

which

is

protected

by

the

Constitution

for

the

promotion of learning.

D.

Personal Users' Tax

Personal users

'

tax is a fee charged at every time when the

copyrighted work is copied by individual users
example of the users

'

.

The earliest

tax is the tax imposed on the public

performance of musical compositions charged by the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers. The users' tax
in this instance can be justified,

since it is charged for

public performance which is a kind of competitive use. 153
However,

the charge of the personal users'

tax is without

legal sanction.

According to our analysis of the purpose and policies of
copyright, the personal users' tax obstacles users' right of
access if personal users have to pay tax at every time they

use the copyrighted works.

It inhibits learning. Copyright

owners not only can profit from the primary market by selling
works, but also can obtain extra benefit from the secondary

market by imposing license fees on individual users. 154 The
statutory right for the copyright owners to control the use
of copyright extends unreasonably to control the use of the

153

id.

at 129.

154 About copyright owners
rights on the primary
secondary market, see generally id. at 186-90.
'

market

and

the

75

work. The nature of copyright as a statutory-grant right is

also nullified by the imposition of the personal users' tax.

The
users'

197 6

Copyright Act explicitly protects individual

right to copy the copyrighted works. In section 107,

scholars and researchers are acknowledged to have the right
to reproduce the copyrighted works in copies or phonorecords

within the fair scope.

155

The further inference from §107 is

that if the fair users have the right to copy the copyrighted
works, the personal users who just use the work ought to have

the same right. Section 108 (d) and (e) permit librarians'

copying of the copyrighted works for personal users. 156 The

personal users

'

tax is both unconstitutional and without

statutory sanction.

Copyright owners claim that individual users will make
copy of the copyrighted works to substitute the purchase of
them. If the reality is really like so, the reason is almost

because of the monopolistic price of the copyrighted works.

Copying a work requires expense of time, money, and energy,
and means the loss of quality. The best way is to make the

works

155

more

17 U.S.C.

attractive

on

both

the

price

and

quality.

§107.

156 Id. §108
(d) & (e). The Supreme Court's decision in Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States further confirms the users' right to
reproduce the copyrighted works for research. 420 U.S. 376 (1975). The
issue in this case was whether the photocopying of copyrighted articles
in medical journals by government medical research institute and its
library on an individual request constituted as an fair use. The Court
of Claims held that this kind of copying which was limited to a single
copy of a single article and to articles of less than 50 pages was a
fair use. 487 F.2d. 1345 (1973). The Supreme Court affirmed it in an
equally divided decision.

76

Copyright is for protecting the works on the market, but not
to guarantee profit. A reasonable price of the work provided
by the copyright owners and a reasonable right of the users

to use the works are the way to balance the two conflict

interests

the copyright owners' interest for profit and the

users' interest for learning.

157

157

About the discussion of the personal users' tax, see Patterson &
at 157-59; see also Patterson, Understanding

LINDBERG, supra note 1,
Fair Use, at 262,263.

CHAPTER

7

CONCLUSION

Personal use is just a small part of copyright. The purpose
of it, like any other copyright principles and rules, is for

promoting the purpose of learning. Because personal use had
not become an issue until the emergence of new technologies,
it has not gained much attentions

The focal point of the personal users
of

access.

'

right is the right

The new technologies give personal users the

convenience to use and copy the copyrighted works.
because the ease to copy,

Just

copyright owners thus ask for

excessive rights which endanger users' right of access. The

scattered power of individual users

is,

powerful

organized power of

enough

fight

to

with

the

of

course,

not

entrepreneurs

Both Congress and the courts must contribute to protect
the personal users' rights. Congress is better to legislate

statutory rules
courts,

when

to

protect personal

decide

specific

users'

copyright

rights.

issues,

The

should

consider copyright as an integrated whole and make their
decisions to reflect copyright policies and principles. The

continuous enhancement of the copyright owners'
rights is detrimental to the users
77

'

rights

exclusive

78

There are three major interests in copyright: the authors'
moral rights,

158

the publishers' marketing rights,

159

and the

users' learning rights. 160 The tendency of American copyright

to emphasize the economic aspect results in the overdeveloped

publishers
users'

'

rights and the underdeveloped authors

'

rights and

rights. Copyright is a comprise between the public

interests and the private interests. All the three rights
must accommodate to each other to accomplish the purpose of
copyright as the promotion of learning.
The future path of personal users

accommodate to the publishers'

'

rights should not only

rights,

but also have the

legal responsibility to respect the authors' moral rights.

Only when these three rights are balanced in a proper way can

learning be promoted.

The value of learning is

reason why copyright is so important in our life.

just the

161

About details of the authors' moral rights, see generally PATTERSON
Lindberg, supra note 1, at 163-76.
158

159

About the publishers' rights, see generally id. at

160

About the discussion of the users'

&

17 7-90.

see generally id.

at

Understanding Fair Use,

at

rights,

191-222.
161

266.

See id. at 225-41; see also Patterson,
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